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Abstraksi 
Sebagai pengetahuan yang mengandalkan data yang dapat dibuktikan 
dan prosedur ilmiah yang baku, pengetahuan ilmiah dianggap sebagai 
pengetahuan yang paling dapat dipercaya dan meyakinkan. 
Keilmiahan disamakan dengan bebas dari segala faktor subjek, karena 
keterlibatan subjek dianggap menodai kemurnian pengetahuan. 
Ilmuwan dalam pengertian yang demikian disamakan dengan mesin 
pencari kebenaran yang tidak memiliki kebebasan dan kreativitas. 
Pandangan ini, menurut Mikael Polanyi, tidak sesuai dengan kenyataan 
yang sebenarnya. Proses yang ditempuh oleh seorang ilmuwan dalam 
mengusahakan suatu penemuan, misalnya, tidak terlepas dari faktor-
faktor personal yang tidak seluruhnya bisa dijelaskan dan ditetapkan 
secara baku. Berangkat dari pengalaman Michael Polanyi sebagai ahli 
dalam bidang fisika dan kimia, refleksinya mengenai bagaimana 
sesungguhnya ilmuwan bekerja menjadi lebih otentik dan aktual. 
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Introduction 
Our age is marked by a notably influential phenomenon of 
science prevailing in every domain. There is no area of our life which is 
not tempted to be scrutinised by scientific approach. Science has 
strengthened and is still strengthening its role in dealing with the 
enigma of the world from inanimate things to the mechanism of 
conscious beings. There is no doubt that in such an effort science is 
gaining more and more applause and support under the conviction that 
it gives more a true and more fair approach to reality in comparison 
with other explanations. Thanks to science we have now a better 
understanding of so many problems that hitherto remained in the dark.  
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Moreover, we are offered many and varied opportunities for dealing 
with nature and organising our performance for a certain purpose. 
 Unfortunately, such a triumph comes not without certain lateral 
consequences. The claim that the scientific approach is the only true and 
valid explanation of reality leads to a conviction that other explanations 
which belong to the rest of our culture,1  were altogether nonsense. 
Science is considered to be winning the competition by offering the most 
convincing and complete feature of the reality. It should not be so 
menacing if there were not a sharp opposition created between science 
and the rest of our culture. In reality, however, there is a gap between 
them, for science tends to discredit other expressions of our experience 
and our enterprise to grasp the meaning of reality seen as unscientific. 
 Why is it then that science is so successful in gaining support of 
the modern mind? It is generally held that the answer must be found on 
the objectivity claimed by science. The objectivity is the most decisive 
word in the vocabulary of science. The obsession of a scientist is to give a 
thoroughly detached description of reality so as to offer a true 
knowledge of his subject. There are of course some parallel movements 
sharing the same spirit claiming the detachment as the criteria of true 
knowledge. Materialistic–positivism, Behaviourism, and Nihilism are all  
on the same line. Their obsession is to remove any human element from 
their presentation of reality. For, in their point of view, such a trace 
offers nothing but a defect in acquiring a true knowledge. 
 In his disagreement to such a programm, Polanyi displays the 
role of personal participation in achieving and holding scientific 
knowledge. Knowledge is a skill requiring the involvement of the 
performer. Polanyi writes, “... all knowing is action—that is our urge to 
understand and control our experience which causes us to rely on some 
parts of it subsidiarily in order to attend to our main objective focally.”2 
Such a structure of knowledge is equally valid for the scientific 
knowledge. 
 This article shows how Michael Polanyi deals with the problem 
of objectivity as the main preoccupation of modern science. Through his 
idea of a personal knowledge Michael Polanyi insists that scientific 
knowledge is and has to be an act of a person, that is of the scientist. This 
leads us to acknowledge the tacit component in scientific knowledge 
notwithstanding the scientists’ claims of explicity and demonstrability, 
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etc. In this circumstance it will be clear that natural science and the 
science of humanity have no great difference. Science then does not 
contradict values as it tends to be mentioned by modern mind. Parallel 
to his notion about the presence of a rationality in nature, Polanyi 
sustains the power of intuition to acquire the rationality in nature. Such 
power is indispensable in the process of discovery. He delights in G. 
Polya’s assertion that discovery, even in mathematics field, is an 
extremely delicate personal art that cannot be presented in a 
mathematical formula. He refers also to Poincaré who argues that a 
discovery is a spontaneous emergence. Polanyi underlines the power of 
our creative guesswork guided by the urge to make contact with a 
reality. 
 It should be kept in mind that such reaffirming the tacit base of 
knowledge forms Polanyi’s far–reaching endeavour to find an 
alternative idea of scientific knowledge. When Polanyi speaks about the 
tacit knowledge his attention touches, undoubtedly, the scientific 
knowledge as his main target. In this article I will explore his idea of the 
nature of scientific knowledge; how he discerns the unaccountable 
element prevailing in science; that science requires indispensably the 
scientist’s tacit construction of particulars elements in a joint meaning. 
 
The Tacit Base of Knowledge 
 It is a general assumption in modern science that detached and 
objective knowledge is the most required characteristic of scientific 
approach. Knowledge, then, has to be wholly specifiable and explicit. 
This, according to Polanyi, is a fatal misconception of every kind of 
knowledge, for such an assumption does not recognise the hidden and 
tacit aspect on which the explicit knowledge founds its base. That is why 
that in his endeavour to approach the nature of knowledge he 
immediately refers to the very characteristic of knowledge. He writes: “I 
shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we can 
know more that we can tell.”3 This fact, though not so easy to be 
explained, is obvious in the daily experience. We know for example the 
difference of a face, let us say the face of our friend,  between hundreds 
even thousands of others, yet we are not able to show precisely every 
characteristic feature of that friend that tells the difference from another. 
 This does not mean that our respective knowledge is not based 
on the reality of the face. It is, but most of this knowledge cannot be put 
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into words. And even if we explain to a friend the characteristic features 
of a student he has to meet in a library, there is still no certainty he is 
going to find the one we intend him to meet. Here lies the question of 
the communicability of knowledge. We cannot adequately tell the 
content of what we know about the face about which we are talking. 
“We know a person’s face and can recognise him among a thousand, 
indeed, among a million. Yet we usually cannot tell how we recognise a 
face we know.”4 
 Let us enrich the example of our capacity to know more than we 
can tell. It is not something exceptional that we catch the mood of a 
human face whether it is angry, happy or is engaging with a serious 
problem. We recognise the mood without being able to explain 
everything on the base of which our conviction is founded. We can 
indicate some clues, but if we are asked to specify the indications more 
precisely we will find difficulty to find exact words for our description. 
We can also refer to some specialists’ experience from various subjects 
who teach students about their specialisation. Polanyi writes: “Great 
efforts are spent in practical classes to teach students to identify cases of 
diseases and specimens of rocks, of plants and animals. All descriptive 
sciences study physiognomies that cannot be fully described in words, 
nor even by pictures.”5 That is why a specialist often, after having 
explained the case with great attempts, eventually asks his students to 
keep the case as a task for a self–struggle and expedition. In the case of 
identifying diseases for example, even an expert specialist is willing to 
admit, “I cannot tell you how to recognise it; you will learn this by more 
extensive experience”. Polanyi explains by comparing the complex 
activity in recognising a human face, that is physiognomy, with other 
kind of knowing involving our capacity to know more than we can tell: 
Clinical practitioners call the peculiar indescribable appearance 
of a pathological condition its facies; I shall call it a 
“physiognomy”, so as to relate it to the delicately varied 
expressions of the human face which we can likewise identify 
without being able to tell quite how we recognise them. We may 
describe as a physiognomy also the peculiar appearance of a 
species which can be recognised only “aesthetically” and further 
include among physiognomies the characteristics of wines and 
blends of tea which only experts can recognise.6 
                                                 
 4 M. Polanyi, Knowing and Being, p. 142. 
 5 M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, p. 5. 
 6 M. Polanyi, Knowing and Being, p. 123. 
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 The fact that we can know more than we can tell, rather than a 
lack of our capacity, is an important characteristic of our knowledge. 
Our mind, as it is obvious in perception, integrates our awareness of 
particulars into a comprehensive entity in the perspective of which we 
are not able to identify these particulars any more. This is an opinion of 
Gestalt psychology, and Polanyi is not reluctant to recognise the merit of 
such a viewpoint though he takes it with some reconsideration. 
 ... my analysis of knowledge is closely linked to this discovery of 
Gestalt psychology. But I shall attend to aspects of Gestalt which 
have been hitherto neglected. Gestalt psychology has assumed that 
perception of a physiognomy takes place through the spontaneous 
equilibration of its particulars impressed on the retina or on the 
brain. However, I am looking at Gestalt, on the contrary, as the 
outcome of an active shaping of experience performed in the pursuit 
of knowledge. This shaping or integrating I hold to be the great and 
indispensable tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered 
and, once discovered, is held to be true.7 
 Polanyi reaches the idea of the process of tacit thought through 
the structure of Gestalt. Its scope now grasps the very largest range of 
our capacity manifesting in the tacit power of scientific and artistic 
genius. These are the highest form of integration. While those performed 
in the art of expert diagnostician and skills, whether artistic, athletic, or 
technical, are seen as somewhat impoverished discovery. However, 
there is no doubt that when he is speaking about knowledge, Polanyi 
means knowledge in its largest sense so as to include the two kinds of 
knowledge proposed by Gilbert Ryle, namely the “knowing what” and 
“knowing how”.8 The “knowing what” contains a more intellectual 
knowledge, while the “knowing how” is a more practical kind of 
activity. The latter includes various use of tools, of probes, of pointers, 
and the use of language. In spite of the difference in some points, the 
two kinds of knowing have a similar structure. That is why Polanyi 
writes: “I shall always speak of knowing, therefore, to cover both 
practical and theoretical knowledge.”9 Both involve the tacit procedure 
that integrates various particulars into a joint meaning of an object or an 
action. 
                                                 
 7 M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, p. 6. 
 8 M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, p.7. 
 9 M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, p.7. 
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The Confutation of the Ideal of Laplacean Goal of Science 
 The most ambitious reductionistic concept of reality is backed by 
the ideal of science held in our time. The obsession of science is to 
represent everything in terms of physics and chemistry; in other words, 
in a materialistic and mechanistic terms. Such an obsession has been 
introduced by Laplace which, according to Michael Polanyi, still remains 
as the most ruling ideal of science today. “The ideal of science remains 
what it was in the time of Laplace: to replace all human knowledge by a 
complete knowledge of atoms in motion.”10 We have seen how this 
ambition is applied within biology and psychology in the enthusiastic 
endeavour to explain life and consciousness in terms of physics and 
chemistry. The quantum mechanics theory, according to Michael 
Polanyi, is simply a branch of such a reductionistic project. 
 
From the Topography of Atoms to the Perfect Knowledge 
 The purpose of science imagined by Laplace is to acquire a 
universal knowledge of the particulars of the universe so as to be able to 
predict exactly every event of the past as well as of the future. More 
precisely Polanyi writes: “Laplace affirmed that if we knew at one 
moment of time the exact positions and velocities of every particle of 
matter in the universe, as well as the forces acting between the particles, 
we could compute the position and velocities of the same particles at 
any other date, whether past or future.”11 In such an ambitious program 
the past and the future have no different value regarding the quality and 
the exactitude of knowledge that we can acquire about them. It assumes 
that provided that our minds are equipped with the information of the 
particles, theoretically the universe can be seen as a transparent vase 
containing no unpredicted and unexplained aspect. 
 It is precisely, according to Polanyi, the heart of the fallacy 
prevailing in science today. Knowledge is confined to the exact 
topography of all atoms constituting the known object. It is impossible, 
Polanyi points out, to arrive at a true knowledge without other element 
outside the topography of atoms, namely the part which we ourselves 
necessarily contribute. “The real fault in the kind of universal 
knowledge defined by Laplace is that it would tell us absolutely nothing 
that we are interested.”12 It turns to be a knowledge without spirit and 
                                                 
10M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 25. 
11M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 29. Again in Personal Knowledge, p. 139. 
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Scientific Thought and Social Reality, p. 85. 
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is, for that reason, paralysed, and logically impossible. Indeed, our 
knowledge does not proceeds as such. If we want to know whether 
some primroses, that we plant today, will bear some blossoming next 
spring, our observation will not be focused, and need not be focused, on 
the atomic composition and its velocity at a certain moment. Our 
question about the primroses can be answered only in terms of 
primroses and not in the topography of atoms. Michael Polanyi writes: 
“The universal mind is utterly useless for this purpose unless it can go 
beyond predicting atomic data and tell us whether they imply the future 
blossoming or failure to blossom of the primroses planted today.”13 
 Laplace however and those who share the same ambition with 
him are eager to substitute our experience with the atomic topography 
and hence explain all kinds of experience in terms of atomic data. 
The tremendous intellectual feat conjured up by Laplace’s 
imagination has diverted attention (in a manner commonly 
practised by conjurers) from the decisive sleight of hand by 
which he substitutes a knowledge of all experience from a 
knowledge of all atomic data. Once you refuse this deceptive 
substitution, you immediately see that the Laplacean mind 
understands precisely nothing and that whatever it knows means 
precisely nothing.14 
In other words, “Laplace’s representation of the universe ignores all our 
normal experience and can answer no question about it.”15 The ideal of 
complete scientific knowledge is obviously not feasible, for it has no 
immediate relation with the vast majority of our experiences. “Indeed, 
his representation of the universe ignores as it stands most of our 
experiences instead of answering our questions in respect to them.”16 
According to Polanyi, Laplace has misunderstood the very nature of 
experimental science by supposing that number and data of themselves 
point to events.  
 The way we use a geographical map to find our way reveals that 
such an assumption is untenable. A geographical map can be compared 
with experimental science in that both of them represent something of a 
deeper content. While a map represents a part of the earth’s surface, 
                                                 
13M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 29. 
14M. Polanyi,, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1974, p. 141. 
15M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 29. 
16M. Polanyi,, Scientific Thought and Social Reality, International 
University Press, New York 1974, p. 86. 
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experimental science represents a much more complicated element of 
experience. Nevertheless, none of them  can be used in themselves 
without our tacit knowledge. To use a map as a guide to a certain 
destination we have to perform three things namely estabilising our 
actual position on the map, finding on the map an itinerary toward the 
destination, and identifying the itinerary by various landmarks in the 
landscape around us. Using a map then needs a right judgement of the 
user, for, as Polanyi writes, “no map can read itself. Neither can the most 
explicit possible treatise on map–reading read a map.”17 It tells us that a 
right judgement cannot simply rely on detailed data, but depends 
mostly on the tacit knowledge and skill of the person using the data. 
 The same condition prevails undoubtedly in the exact sciences 
praised by Laplace in his effort to define a universal and complete 
knowledge. It is exactly the target of Polanyi’s criticism. In exact science, 
rather than using a map a scientist use formulas. There is no difference, 
Polanyi holds, of the way we use a map and relying on formulas in 
scientific procedure. Three similar stages can be found in scientific 
procedure in an interpretation of experience. 
First we make some measurements which yield a set of numbers 
representing our experience at the start; from these numbers we 
then compute, by the aid of formulas, a future event; finally, we 
look out for the experience predicted by our computation. At 
both the beginning and the end we identify numbers with 
observed events, and this too is a kind of map–reading, for which 
we must rely once more on our personal skill. Numbers do not of 
themselves point to events.18 
 Indeed numbers do not of themselves point to events. In reality 
however, the assumption of such possibility remains influential. 
Consider for example what happens in astronomy, held by Laplace, as a 
model of his ambition. Astronomers holding the Laplacean spirit think it 
possible to make an exact prediction of the position of the planets by the 
mathematical sciences. The objection of Michael Polanyi is as follows. 
You might think that Newton’s laws could predict the exact 
position of the planets at any future moment of time. But this 
they can never do. Astronomers can merely compute from one 
set of numbers, which they identify with the position of a planet 
                                                 
17M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 30. 
18M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 30; see also Scientific Thought and Social Reality, 
p. 86. 
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at a particular time, another set of numbers, which will represent 
its position at a future moment of time. But no formulas can 
foretell the actual readings on our instruments. These readings 
will rarely, if ever, coincide with the predicted numbers as 
computed from Newton’s laws and there is no rule—and can be 
no rule—on which we can rely for deciding whether the 
discrepancies between theory and observation should be 
shrugged aside as observational errors or be recognized, on the 
contrary, as actual deviations from the theory. The assessment in 
each case is personal judgement.19 
 Polanyi does not intend to underestimate all the scientific effort 
in understanding reality. Yet he does not accept the idea of a scientific 
knowledge based totally on the exact data of particulars. The tacit 
components must play a decisive role even in the formal and exact 
science. He notes that even a writer like Kant, who holds the strict rules 
of pure reason, admits an inscrutable faculty exercised in every act of 
judgement. Every time we identify something as a dog, cat, tree, and 
whatever else, we are performing a secret trick which is unlikely ever to 
be revealed to our understanding. Kant occasionally can only say that 
the way our intelligence forms and applies the scheme of a class to an 
individual thing is a skill so deeply hidden in the human soul that we 
shall hardly guess the secret trick that nature here employs.20 
 
Science and Daily Knowledge 
 The obsession of building an ideal science cleaned of any 
informal knowledge is, for Polanyi, nonsensical. A Scientist never start 
his research from zero. The fundamental concepts of biology are 
necessarily based on every day experience in which measurement plays 
no part. “The existence of animals was not discovered by zoologists, 
much less by atomic physicists or chemist; nor was the existence of 
plants discovered by botanists. We learn to distinguish living beings 
from inanimate matter long before we study biology, and when we do 
                                                 
19M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 30. 
20M. Polanyi, “The Unaccountable Element In Science”, p. 1. Here 
Polanyi refers to the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant writes about the schema 
of the concept as the conditions of sensibility, which constitute the universal 
condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object. 
According to Kant this faculty is an art concealed in the depth of human soul, 
and for that reason it is hardly possible to discover. 
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study it, we continue to use our original concept of life.”21 The same 
thing is equally valid in other fields of science. Before performing a 
psychological approach, one has to know from ordinary experience 
what intelligence is. Medical science as a task can be used only by 
ordinary people who know the suffering of sickness and the joy of 
recovery. Otherwise this performance will be disoriented and 
meaningless. 
 One may oppose this firm position by saying that science always 
develops and modifies our every day knowledge. It is true, Polanyi 
admits, but this fact does not cross out  the fact that there still remains a 
vast range of everyday knowledge that serves as a guide to biology, 
medicine, psychology, and to various disciplines that study man and 
society. This kind of knowledge, according to Polanyi, are but a complex 
and delicate outcome of human experience transmitted by our 
predecessors in the form of practical arts. It is an art, for we are not 
taught any explicit rules in forming the idea and the concept we hold. 
Accordingly, there is no difference of how students are taught a 
scientific skill and an expert knowledge in the classroom, in the library, 
and in the laboratory. There is no expert who can exhaustively tell his 
listerners the knowledge he has acquired through his life and 
experiments. If he can, then there is no need of wasting time and money 
in building and use the laboratory in which the apprentices spend time 
and energy. In the last resort, an expert has to  encourage his disciples 
saying “experience will teach you more.” Laplace, in Polanyi’s point of 
view, seems to forget this fact when he proclaimed his vision of the 
extreme idealisation of the exact science. 
To claim that a worldwide topography of atoms represents 
universal knowledge is to contradict the very principle of 
identification which must be used even in a mathematical theory 
if it is to bear upon experience. Hence, if the Laplacean vision or 
a similar ideal of the exact sciences succeeded in establishing 
itself as the total of man’s knowledge, it would impose complete 
ignorance on us.22 
 The true attitude toward science, according to Polanyi, is 
understanding it in the context of skill and connoisseurship. In such an 
understanding we will see that scientific knowledge cannot be presented 
and limited in terms of exact rules and the knowledge of some amount 
of particulars. 
                                                 
21M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 32. 
22M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 32. 
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Informal Procedure in Science 
 When Polanyi emphasises the inadequacy of the complete 
knowledge of the particulars to establish our real knowledge of certain 
object, he opposes the strong ambition of reductionistic programme 
backed by the precise rules. It is generally held that the purpose of the 
exact science is to establish a complete intellectual control over 
experience in terms of precise rules which can be formally set out and 
empirically tested. Once that ideal rules are established formally, then 
our task is to follow them so as to be able to explain everything without 
error. In order to see the falsity of such an assumption, Polanyi makes an 
analysis of the role of the informal aspect in scientific knowledge. 
 
Classification of Different Things 
 The main step on which science assumes to base its procedure 
are observation and testing. From several numbers of thorough 
observation and certain numbers of test scientists establish the law of 
nature. Polanyi describes his observation about this claim: “It is 
customary today to represent the process of scientific  enquiry as the 
setting up of a hypothesis followed by its subsequent testing.”23 The 
question is how those scientists arrive at this formal procedure and how 
exactly they apply it? According to Polanyi there is always some aspect 
that cannot be specified in a specifically scientific procedure. In the 
introduction to his article The Unaccountable Element In Science he clarifies 
his purpose. He writes: “[...] I shall speak of the contributions made to 
scientific thought by acts of personal judgement which cannot be 
replaced by the operation of explicit reasoning.”24 This is something that 
escapes the scrutiny of formal procedure claimed in science. 
 Many thinkers, since Plato, have tried to explain the cognitive 
mechanism in applying the concept of class for certain individual things. 
Plato is the first troubled by this enigma. He noted that while we 
recognise the particularity of every single man, we still accept him as a 
man. Hence we apply to it a general idea of man. The problem is, how 
can we do this and what kind of man is the one to whom we apply all 
individual men? Plato has suggested that the man in question must be a 
perfect man without any particular characteristic. Because these 
characteristics mean imperfection, in his opinion an individual man is 
                                                 
23M. Polanyi, “The Unaccountable Element in Science”, p. 12. 
24M. Polanyi, “The Unaccountable Element in Science”, p. 1. 
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just an imperfect copy of the general idea. The answer is genius, yet 
leaves the problem unanswered: what is the secret of identifying 
different individuals into a class? 
 At about 900 years ago Roscellinus suggested a solution to the 
paradox of identification within the framework of nominalism. He 
concluded that the word “man” is but a name of a collection of 
individual men. This however, according to Polanyi, offers nothing but a 
proof of the fallacy of the explicit rules in resolving the problem. Polanyi 
writes about this: 
But the indeterminacy reappears once more when we ask how to 
justify the labelling of a collection of different individuals by the 
same name and how, moreover, we can continue to label in a 
constant fashion, as time goes on, any number of further 
individuals differing in every particular from any individual thus 
labelled before and yet can continually exclude a vast number of 
other individuals as not belonging to the class we have labelled.25 
 Even Immanuel Kant, who is so powerfully eager to establish the 
rules of pure reason, eventually admits that in every act of judgement 
there involves some elements that cannot be grasped by the explicit 
rules. Polanyi obviously considers this submission as an acceptance of a 
kind of the tacit power of mind beyond our scrutinising endeavour. It is 
an art so deeply rooted in our soul so that we can hardly discover. 
However he regrets the systematic exclusion of this powerful mental 
agency from nearly every analysis of both Kant and his successors for 
fear of destroying the very base of the justification of knowledge in the 
framework of rationalism. “Perhaps both Kant and his successors 
instinctively preferred to let such sleeping monsters lie, for fear that, 
once awakened, they might destroy their fundamental conception of 
knowledge.”26 
                                                 
25M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 52; see also Knowing and Being, p. 166 : “[...] his 
own view, that the word “man” is but the name for a collection of individual 
men, leaves open the question how we can justify the labelling of a collection of 
different individuals by the same name—a question that is further accentuated 
by our expectation that we shall yet be able to subsume under this label future 
instances of men differing in every particular from any man thus labelled 
before. The difficulty is not eliminated by specifying the characteristic features 
of man, since in doing so we must again repeatedly use one name for instance 
of a feature that are different in every particular.” 
26M. Polanyi, “The Unaccountable Element in Science”, p. 2. 
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 A more recent attempt to approach the question was launched in 
1945 by F. Waismann. To understand the enigma of how we see a unity 
of different things, he suggested that a general terms has to be 
considered as having an open texture. Such an open texture, in his 
opinion, admits differences in the instances. This of course does not 
resolve the problem. According to Polanyi it simply shifts the problem 
rather than offers an solution. “For to ascribe “open texture” to a word is 
merely to imply that among an indefinitely extending series of different 
objects the word properly applies to some objects and not to the rest. The 
question how this is done remains open, exactly as before.”27 W.V.O. 
Quine seemed to be in a right direction when he was eventually 
encouraged to accept the conclusion reached by Kant, that the grounds 
on which instances are assigned to an empirical category of objects are 
inscrutable. 
 The acceptance of Kant’s conclusion by Quine is seen by Polanyi 
as an acknowledgement of the power of our tacit integration that cannot 
be reduced. Any attempt to bring this activity to a reductive explanation 
has been misguided. The capacity to classify different objets, Polanyi 
insists, can be comprehended only if we acknowledge the role of tacit 
knowledge. He writes: 
Tacit knowing commonly integrates groups of particulars into 
their joint meaning. Members of a class such as a species, a 
family, or a language—or members of any other group properly 
denoted by a single universal term—possess a joint focal 
meaning when dwelt in as subsidiary clues to such a meaning, 
even though their focus is almost empty in contrast to a focal 
object of perception. Moreover, the meaning of a class is an 
aspect of reality, for it points to yet unrevealed joint properties of 
its members. If the joint appearance of disparate members of a 
class in the conception of a class should need support by analogy, 
think once more of binocular vision uniting two slightly different 
images in a single image of a different sensory character; or of the 
fact that the way we see an object integrates, among many other 
events in the body, innumerable memories beyond conscious 
recollection; or of a metaphor fusing two disparate ideas in a 
powerful joint meaning we have never before encountered.28 
                                                 
27M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 52; see also Personal Knowledge, p. 113. 
28M. Polanyi, Meaning, pp. 52-53. This problem is also approached when 
Polanyi talks about the reinterpretation of language. He writes: “The adaptation 
of our conceptions and of the corresponding use of language to new things that 
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 The problem of a universal term is of course a real problem of 
empirical induction. In fact each instance of a law differs in every 
particular from other instance of it. How, then, can a general law be 
strictly formulated from individual experience? According to Polanyi, it 
can be done only by relying on the tacit power. “Such indeterminately 
variable experiences can indeed be subsumed under the same law only 
by relying on our awareness of them as clues to it. And just as for 
perception, many clues of empirical induction will be easily identified in 
themselves, while many will not be and not all of them can be, 
identified.”29 Accordingly, the major part of scientists’ hunches may be 
based on subsception. Here we see again what Polanyi means when he 
talks about science as a skill or as an art.30 It tells us the difference  
between how a scientist and a non scientist see a reality. He writes: 
“And just as a keen eyesight enables one to discriminate objects that 
others cannot see, so does a gift of scientific discovery reveal natural 
laws in a scientific experience which signifies nothing to others not so 
gifted.”31 
 Skill and art can only be mastered through example and personal 
experience in dealing with certain problems. There is no strict rules an 
expert may follow to transfer his expertise to his disciples. A new 
scientist, then, has to train his eyes, his mind, and his feelings so as to be 
able to pick up from certain various data the right clues to hit on the 
problem he is dealing with. With this in mind we are following Polanyi’s 
                                                                                                                       
we identify as new variants of known kinds of things is achieved subsidiarily, 
while our attention is focused on making sense of a situation in front of us. [...] 
The meaning of speech thus keeps changing in the act of groping for words 
without our being focally aware of the change, and our groping invest words in 
this manner with a fund of unspecifiable connotations. Language is the product 
of man’s groping for words in the process of making new conceptual decisions, 
to be conveyed by words.” (Personal Knowledge, p. 112). 
29M. Polanyi, Knowing and Being, pp. 166-167. 
30Polanyi describes the equality of the formation of classification of 
different things and the discovery of natural laws. Both are based on the process 
of tacit knowing. “I am interpreting the formation of class concepts (along with 
the discovery of natural laws) as based ultimately on a process of tacit knowing, 
the operations of which I have exemplified in the learning of skills, the 
recognition of physiognomies, the mastery of tests, the use of tools, the uttering 
of speech, and the act of visual perception. The powers of integration which 
achieve these acts have the same structure throughout.” (M. Polanyi, Knowing 
and Being, p. 167). 
31M. Polanyi, Knowing and Being, p. 167. 
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idea that the establishment of the law of nature is based on an unexplicit 
procedure. 
 
Puzzlement and Insight in Scientific Explanation 
 The informal procedure as an integral part of science can be seen 
also in our experience in capturing an understanding of a puzzling 
event. Polanyi notes that the way in which we produce a scientific 
explanation depends on our propensity to be puzzled. There are indeed 
different views of how certain events have to be considered as puzzling. 
One radium, for example, may decompose today while another one 
perhaps fifty years later. For most physicists it is nonsensical to be 
puzzled by such a difference in time, because there is no explanation for 
this fact. Some argue that it is nonsensical to be puzzled by events 
which, though they may be explicable in principle, are not ripe for 
explanation or are not worth the trouble  of explaining. Other scientists, 
however, hold a fundamental difference of opinion by accepting such a 
different event of decomposition as puzzling. We see then that being 
puzzled implies a selective judgement. For Polanyi indeed, 
notwithstanding the variations of the advisability of being puzzled, a 
scientific explanation must serve to dispel puzzlement. 
 Establishing an explanation is only one approach to release 
tension of being puzzled. Polanyi even believes that an explanation can 
be well understood in the light of another means, that is insight or 
understanding. What is the difference between these two approaches? 
Let us see what Polanyi tells as an example. 
 We may be puzzled by the way an intricate piece of machinery is 
constructed and the way it works or by the structure of a huge building 
in which we are loosing our way. In such a situation our main urge goes 
directly to get understanding or insight rather than searching for 
explanation. Our first aim is to catch the whole particulars of the object 
or the event and attain through them a joint meaning. More precisely, 
Polanyi writes: 
What we are seeking here is an understanding of the machine or 
the building—an insight into them, but not an explanation. Such 
insight is a particular type of tacit integration that has not yet 
been mentioned. Its subsidiary items are the particulars of the 
complex entity—the machine, or the  rooms in the building; and 
when we integrate these particulars and thus bring out their joint 
meaning, their puzzling aspect is transformed into a lucid image. 
Our puzzlement in these cases is relieved by an insight which is 
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itself simply our own meaningful integration of the parts of the 
complex entity.32 
 Obviously, the act of insight is not an image that can be laid 
down on a sheet of paper. Its aspects are too rich to be able to be 
presented on a plain surface. Every particular we write on the paper can 
just offer a tiny clue of a much more deep aspect of a three dimensional 
reality such as the anatomy of a complex living thing, or a complex 
arrangement of geological strata, or a complex arrangement in crystals. 
Only a powerful integrating activity of the mind, that is insight, that 
leads us to dwell in such tiny clues and through them to capture their 
joint meaning. “Only by combining such aspects in the imagination can 
a three–dimensional understanding of the aggregate be achieved. Such 
insight is a purely mental fact, like any other focal target, comprising a 
large number of subsidiaries.”33 For that reason, according to Polanyi, 
insight is different from the focal target in a stereo vision, in reading a 
sentence, or in probing a cavity. As it has been noted, the focal target of a 
stereo vision lies away from the subsidiary. In insight however, the focal 
target coincides in our imagination with its parts.34 
 Insight is something beyond the power of articulation. Wolfgang 
Köhler has noticed an interesting behaviour performed by a chimpanzee 
dealing with a rope wound loosely twice around a pole. The 
chimpanzee, wonderfully, did not pull the rope blindly at its end but 
went around the rod so that the string is unwound and disengaged. The 
chimpanzee, Köhler concluded, has a clear idea to resolve the problem, 
to disengage the string by rendering it unwound. Polanyi sees it as a 
manifestation of insight performed by the chimpanzee. Human thought 
proceeds in a relatively equal procedure in confronting a certain 
puzzling situation which immediately prompts us to make a basic 
question as to how it works. Such a question guides us to find an insight, 
a deep understanding of the situation. It is in the light of the similar 
question that a scientist goes on immersing into his subject and 
discovers the law of nature. Polanyi indicates some examples: 
[...] we understand living things, the functioning of their organs 
and the working of their intelligence, by an act of indwelling, 
which is also an act of insight. Similar insight is involved in 
taxonomy, which orders biological specimens much as X–ray 
                                                 
32M. Polanyi, Meaning, pp. 53-54. 
33M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 54. 
34The Collins Cobuild English Dictionary defines insight as an accurate 
and deep understanding of a complex situation or problem. 
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crystallography does in establishing the space group to which a 
crystalline specimen belongs.35 
 It is also insight which guides to the discovery of Kepler’s 
planetary laws.36 If insight precedes explanation, then it must also play 
an important role in scientific explanation. An explanation assumes a 
submission to a general law as its base that can be attained  only in an 
insightful activity. It is precisely what happens in a recognition of 
inference in nature. “The possibility for extending the recognition of 
inference in nature consists in subsuming a natural law within a more 
general law of which it is a special case.”37 About this Polanyi seems to 
agree with some modern philosophers such as J. Stuart Mill, Carl G. 
Hampel, Oppenheim, and Ernest Nagel. He reminds, however, that to 
limit an analysis of  such a vast area to its fragments may obscure the 
subject. In Polanyi’s opinion, it is such a case which is practised in the 
behaviouristic explanation, in which the obsession of a strictly formal 
approach, reduces the explanation to a merely formal subsumption of a 
natural law under a more general law. The actual subject matter in this 
approach is restricted to a fragment found suitable for the formalisation. 
Such a formalisation, Polanyi notes, “if carried out strictly, produces a 
result that is strictly, in itself, empty of any bearing on the subject matter; 
but by calling it an “explanation”, one imbues it with the memory of that 
informal, insightful act of the mind which it was supposed to replace.”38 
 What we see in such a replacement is a kind of pseudosubstitution. 
In one side there is a formal act of denying the mental powers here, 
while at the same time its ultimate consequence is avoided by borrowing 
the qualities of the powers formally tempted to eliminate. Such is the 
danger of the idea of scientific explanation held as separated from the 
power of the mind and even eliminates the role of the mind itself. “A 
pseudosubstitution is a gesture of intellectual self–destruction that is 
kept within safe bounds by its inconsistency.”39 Our culture, in Polanyi’s 
opinion, is pervaded by such intellectual subterfuges. 
 
                                                 
35M. Polanyi, Meaning, pp. 54-55. 
36M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 54. 
37M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 55. 
38M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 55. 
39M. Polanyi, Meaning, pp. 55-56. 
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Empirical Generalisation 
 The informal procedure applies also in an empirical 
generalisation within the pursuit of science. This aspect, however, seems 
to loose within the shadow of the claim of strict criteria and 
formalisation. Polanyi points out three indication that lead to such a 
misleading idea. First, there is no strict criteria through which we can 
establish the idea of the exact starting point of an inquiry. This kind of 
shortage tempts philosophers to abandon any endeavour to understand 
how it is done. The second seems to be contradicting. Although 
philosophers arrived at the conclusion that no formal rule of inference 
can establish a valid empirical generalisation, they deny after all that the 
generalisation can be derived from experimental data. They ignore the 
fact that valid generalisations are commonly arrived at by empirical 
inquiries based on informal procedure. Third, some philosophers claim 
that a hypothesis will be immediately left if it is found conflicting with a 
single evidence. Such a claim, in Polanyi’s view, is untenable. The claim 
that a scientist will immediately abandon his former claim when he 
notices a contradictory information, is far from the experience of how 
discovery is made. Moreover, a contradictory piece of evidence cannot 
be formally identified.40 
 In his work, Science, Faith and Society, Michael Polanyi delineates 
for the first time his idea about the informal powers which guide not just 
the pursuit of science but also provide criteria for accepting its result. He 
shows us the process by which we usually first establish the reality of 
certain things around us. How do we perform this? Polanyi writes: “Our 
principle clue to the reality of an object is its possession of a coherent 
outline.”41 Gestalt psychology, he admits, offers us an idea of our 
remarkable performance involved in perceiving shapes. In observing a 
ball or an egg, for example, we see their shapes at a glance. The case, 
however, will be different if the impression made on our eyes by the 
aggregate of white points forming the surface of an egg is substituted by 
another presentation of these points as given by a list of their special co-
ordinate values. In the absence of guessing, years of labour would be 
needed before the shape inherent in that aggregate could be discovered. 
 We can conclude then, following Polanyi’s conviction, that the 
capacity to perceive the shape of an egg at a glance, from the list of co–
                                                 
40M. Polanyi, Meaning, p. 56 
41M. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society: a Searching examination of the 
meaning and nature of scientific inquiry (2nd edition), The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1964, p. 24. 
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ordinate values, is similar to the intellectual power performed by 
scientists that guides to a great discovery such as the Copernican system. 
“We can say,” he writes, “that the capacity of scientists to guess the 
presence of shapes as tokens of reality differs from the capacity of our 
ordinary perception, only by the fact that it can integrate shapes 
presented to it in terms which the perception of ordinary people cannot 
readily handle.”42 The scientist’s intuition trained in his expertise can 
consider some dispersed information and data—seen in ordinary sight 
as irrelevant—as clues for a certain shape. Through his sharp and well 
trained intuition, a scientist can arrive at a meaningful integration from 
particulars which for others might seem meaningless and offer no idea 
of the possibility lying ahead. 
 This does not mean that the result achieved by such intuition 
cannot hit an erroneous path. Indeed, a scientific perception may be 
erroneous, just as our daily perception may misperceive a camouflaged 
body. The main point of Polanyi’s concerns here is the impossibility of 
reducing the proposition of science to merely a formal procedure. “I am 
concerned here,” he asserts, “only with showing that some of the 
characteristic features of the propositions of science exclude the 
possibility of deriving these by definite operations applied to primary 
observation; and to demonstrate that the process of their discovery must 
involve an intuitive perception of the real structure of natural 
phenomena.”43 
 
 
                                                 
42M. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, p. 24. 
43M. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society. pp. 24-25. Here Polanyi admits a 
kinship between perception and scientific discovery as it has been previously 
suggested by Poincaré, Hadamard, and Polya. Later he finds more confirmation 
of this position from J.B. Conant, Thomas S. Kuhn, and Leonard K. Nash. See 
also Meaning, p. 56. 
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Conclusion 
 The main concerns of Michael Polanyi as shown above is the 
nature of scientific knowledge related with the idea of how scientists 
work.  Scientific knowledge is a human activity, and according to this 
very basic principle it cannot be pursued in a totally detached and 
objective procedure. There is always personal participation in 
scientific activity. The personal participation held by Michael Polanyi 
as the elemental contribution of the knower in his act of knowing is 
equally as effective in scientific knowledge as it is in the daily 
knowledge, in art, in religion, and in the rest of our culture. The 
anticipation of reality, intuition, and imagination, for example, are 
indispensable in the process that leads to a scientific discovery.  It is 
clearly held that such participation is an indispensable contribution 
rather than a defect to the scientist’s activity in pursuing the truth. 
Accordingly the idea of science offered by Michael Polanyi has 
an anthropological aspect, for it continuously reminds us of our 
important role in exploring the hidden aspect of  reality. By 
espousing the role of personal aspect, Michael Polanyi does not 
intend to obscure the meaning of objective reality as something 
outside there and considers it as mere intrapersonal entity which is 
specific to a given knower. For him, the ultimate criterion of the 
objectivity is of course the reality itself. He is dealing, however, with 
the way we reach reality; in other words, how we know and how 
scientists work. 
 The epistemology offered by Michael Polanyi was moved by 
his belief that there are so many kinds of human suffering caused by 
the false idea of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge. For him 
science is a human activity dealing with the nature of reality. 
According to R. A. Hodgkin, it is such a view of what scientist is that 
makes his idea of science particularly attractive today44.  As a human 
activity, though, science cannot work by itself, and it is even 
meaningless without any participation of the scientists who 
understand and interpret the theories and the data offered by science. 
This may seem eccentric, for as long as we follow the ruling idea of 
science of our time, every human bias intervening in a scientific 
procedure is considered as a defect and hence is to be abolished. It is 
generally held, that scientific knowledge surpasses any other kind of 
                                                 
44R. A. HODGKIN, ‘Michael Polanyi’, Convivium, 4 (Summer 1977), p. 11. 
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effort to understand reality for its strict criterion to rule out much of 
human participation. In such perspective, science in itself is claimed 
to be the main factor in offering knowledge of reality, while scientists 
are no more than obstacle. 
 Science for Polanyi is the activity of human beings, namely the 
scientists. Its process, persistence, and development in the scientific 
society all require an enthusiastic participation of the scientists. When 
Michael Polanyi explicitly opposes the motto of The Royal Society, 
nullius in verba, which means the refutation of authority, and Bacon’s 
claim that science was to be based on purely empirical methods, he 
invites us to re–establish our place in scientific effort; and to oppose 
the dictum that in science facts alone count. When we say that science 
is a human activity we acknowledge the importance of the human 
factor, that is the creative involvement of the scientists, in selecting, 
interpreting and integrating the data in a scientific framework. 
Unlike a truth-finding machine, automatically collecting empirical 
data, a scientist is a creative actor in his scientific activity. There is no 
exact rule that can securely lead to the solution of a problem. Neither 
the availability of complex data can guarantee the solution of a 
problem and the attainment of a great discovery without the creative 
involvement of the scientists. In this sense, scientific activity is an art. 
All that can be done by a scientist is to rely on his personal tacit 
power which integrates the available data while he is exploring the 
hidden aspect of reality. *** 
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